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FOLLY TO THE GREEKS:
GOOD REASONS TO GIVE UP REASON
STEPHEN R. L. CLARK
University of Liverpool
Abstract. Good reasons to “give up reason” are (i) naturalistic reasons 
that downplay the likely effectiveness of human mentation - these lead to 
contradiction if naturalism itself is reckoned “really true”; (ii) there are 
pragmatic reasons to license and enjoy imaginative stories that conflict with 
principles elevated as “rational”; (iii) mystical reasons, which take account of 
the revolutionary aspects of certain “religious” disciplines, and throw doubt on 
what we “naturally” take for granted.
THeSIS: rATIoNAl relIGIoN
on past occasions I’ve argued that both the content of commonsensical 
reasoning and the methods and axioms that we identify with “reason” or 
“scientific reason” are themselves accepted “on faith”, though we may call 
it “intuition” or “intellect”. I have also suggested that this faith is at least 
more “reasonable”, or consistent, when couched in theistic terms. So far 
from theism being at odds with “science”, science, both historically and 
logically, gives some support to theism: at least the apparent success of 
science is better explained, and more expectable, on a theistic account 
than on a naturalistic. The words that David Hume invented for Philo 
have a  wider impact than is usually acknowledged: “what peculiar 
privilege has this little agitation of the brain which we call ‘thought’ that 
we must thus make it the model of the whole universe?”1 What indeed? 
Why should we suppose that the patterns we discern are ones that the 
1 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), part 2.
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whole universe obeys? We recognize that we have the sensory organs 
and modalities we do because these were the ones that helped our 
ancestors survive and procreate, and that other creatures, for equivalent 
reasons, sense things differently. Why should our intellectual gifts be any 
better fitted to an understanding of worlds and ages far away? What has 
been called the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics2 is a sort of 
confirmation that we have the root of the matter in us, that our intellect is 
a spark of the universal reason, an image of the God on whom everything 
depends.3 or else, of course, we should rather abandon that conviction, 
and with it any confidence that mathematics is more than a sometimes 
useful fiction. The “success” of science can only be pragmatic, parochial, 
transient, and we have no reason to extrapolate the patterns that we 
happen to see here-now to a wider world. Nor can we reasonably suppose 
both that there are no universal binding obligations (that is, that there is 
no God) and also that there is a universal binding obligation to pursue 
“the truth”. If  atheistical naturalists are correct we cannot reasonably 
expect to discover truths beyond, at best, the parochial, nor do we have 
any obligation to try. most creatures, as Plotinus pointed out, manage 
quite well without reasoning4, and so do most people. Conversely, if we 
can and should pursue and prefer the truth, then a form of theism is, 
essentially, correct.
I don’t wish to withdraw these claims. my belief is that we can rely 
on “reason”, even though we should also acknowledge that it is often 
obscured by ignorance, stupidity, self-conceit, wishful thinking, malice 
and all other sorts of sin. The principal dogmas of mainstream Abrahamic 
theism provide a proper context for that cautious confidence. There is 
a single source for all things; this source is expressed in the logos, and 
the logos is, at least, available to us. This does not constitute a “proof ” 
of those dogmas – I doubt if there are ever any final or conclusive or 
universally persuasive proofs of anything – but atheistical naturalists are 
2 eugen Wigner, “The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the Natural 
Sciences” in Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, 13 (1960), pp. 1-14.
3 So also benedict XVI (2009): ‘the objective structure of the universe and the 
intellectual structure of the human being coincide; the subjective reason and the 
objectified reason in nature are identical. In the end it is “one” reason that links both 
and invites us to look to a unique creative Intelligence’: url = <http://www.vatican.
va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/messages/pont-messages/2009/documents/hf_ben-xvi_
mes_20091126_fisichella-telescopio_en.html> (accessed 29th April 2011).
4 Plotinus, Ennead, I.4 [46].2, pp. 31-43.
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at least condemned to a more incoherent doctrine than are theists, as 
they must believe simultaneously that creatures like us are unlikely to 
be equipped to understand the cosmos, and that they themselves know 
enough to know that theism is mistaken.
Chesterton was almost right to say that “all sane men ... believe firmly 
and unalterably in a certain number of things which are unproved and 
unprovable”. He listed them as follows:
every sane man believes that the world around him and the people in it are 
real, and not his own delusion or dream. No man starts burning london 
in the belief that his servant will soon wake him for breakfast. but that I, 
at any given moment, am not in a dream, is unproved and unprovable. 
That anything exists except myself is unproved and unprovable.
All sane men believe that this world not only exists, but matters. every 
man believes there is a sort of obligation on us to interest ourselves in 
this vision or panorama of life. He would think a man wrong who said, 
“I did not ask for this farce and it bores me. I am aware that an old lady 
is being murdered down-stairs, but I am going to sleep.” That there is any 
such duty to improve the things we did not make is a thing unproved 
and unprovable.
All sane men believe that there is such a thing as a self, or ego, which is 
continuous. There is no inch of my brain matter the same as it was ten 
years ago. but if I have saved a man in battle ten years ago, I am proud; 
if I have run away, I am ashamed. That there is such a paramount “I” is 
unproved and unprovable. but it is more than unproved and unprovable; 
it is definitely disputed by many metaphysicians.
lastly, most sane men believe, and all sane men in practice assume, that 
they have a power of choice and responsibility for action.5
like Chesterton, I think that these fundamental principles – however 
I might also seek to qualify them – are necessary for our sanity and the 
civil peace, and that they are easier (psychologically and logically) for 
theists to maintain. In brief, “reason” and “faith” are compatible: there 
is nothing unreasonable about taking some things “on faith” (for  we 
5 G.K. Chesterton, Daily News, June 22, 1907: a reference I owe to martin Ward, and 
his collection of Chesterton texts: url = <http://www.gkc.org.uk/gkc/> (accessed 29th 
April 2011). See also edward Herbert, De Veritate, tr. m.H. Carré (bristol: Arrowsmith, 
1937), p. 83: “Truth exists: the sole purpose of this proposition is to assert the existence 
of truth against imbeciles and sceptics.”
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must if we are ever to reason at all), and nothing amiss in principle 
with mainstream theistic doctrines (for they make it easier to believe 
in reason). but I shall now proceed to present what I take to be good 
reasons not to be ruled by reason.
but first I should explain more clearly what I take “reason” to be. 
Considered simply as a spark of the divine, “reason” must stand for our 
recognition of beauty, truth and holiness, whereby we also acknowledge 
our own dependence, failures, fallibility. lovejoy’s analysis is more 
abstract than Chesterton’s, but just as valuable.
The primary and most universal faith of man [is] his inexpugnable 
realism, his twofold belief that he is on the one hand in the midst of 
realities which are not himself nor mere obsequious shadows of himself, 
a world which transcends the narrow confines of his own transient being; 
and on the other hand that he can himself somehow read beyond those 
confines and bring those external existences within the compass of his 
own life yet without annulment of their transcendence.6
richard rorty’s declaration that this faith is absurd7 is no more coherent 
than any similarly Protagorean creed: obviously, rorty wishes to say that 
lovejoy was simply wrong to believe that there were truths we did not 
and do not engineer and yet can partly grasp, but he can only manage this 
rebuttal if indeed there are. but however silly rorty’s claim may be it does 
confirm my first assertion: those who won’t believe in God may easily end 
up not believing in reason or the truth. What then stands in for “reason” 
in the older, higher sense? What guddle of capacities, beliefs and habits 
should we call “reasoning”, if we are to start from a non-theistic position? 
What counts as “reason” if we put aside the older notion that it is a spark 
of the divine, a willed commitment to beauty, truth and goodness?
Commonsensically, people are judged “rational” when they set aside 
any personal, peculiar, subjective feelings about their situation, so as to 
think and act as they could advise just anyone to think and act. They are 
judged “rational” when they take account of the likely effects of what they 
do before responding carelessly in rage or lust or fear. They are “rational” 
if they manage not to contradict themselves too often, do not endorse 
any very novel thesis until there is “evidence” for it, and stand ready to 
abandon older certainties - when they think it right. “rational” people 
distinguish dreams from waking, are suspicious of whatever sounds 
6 A. o. lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism (la Salle, Illinois: open Court, 1930), p. 14.
7 r. m. rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (oxford: blackwell, 1980), p. 52n.
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“too good to be true”, and usually prefer to do and think only what has 
been done and thought before. “rational” people are mildly suspicious 
of what gurus, self-styled experts, dictators and most politicians say, 
but also hesitate before accepting what is said by anonymous critics of 
the establishment. Sometimes these rough rules of thumb are elevated 
to more general principles, and begin to sound absurd. Clifford’s 
rule, for notorious example, that one should never believe anything 
without sufficient evidence, is both vague, self-refuting (since there is 
no unquestionable evidence for this strategy) and impractical, since we 
are doomed always to be acting on inadequate information.8 Indeed it 
is difficult to see how we could ever get experimental or theoretical or even 
anecdotal “proof ” of anything without accepting it as at least a working 
hypothesis long before there was “proof ” – and such acceptance has 
its costs, which are only cheerfully endured by those who “believe”, in 
advance of evidence, that the search will be worthwhile. Nor is it always 
sensible, or honourable, to disregard our personal feelings, and peculiar 
loyalties, when deciding who or what to believe. At any rate perennial 
sceptics and disloyal partners (quick to disbelieve their significant other’s 
protests unless just anyone would “have to believe them now”) are not 
well-regarded. Nor need they be less often deceived by life than are more 
trusting, loving agents.
Clifford’s further conviction was that “we may go beyond experience 
by assuming that what we do not know is like what we do know; or, 
in other words, we may add to our experience on the assumption of 
a uniformity in nature.” but this assumption is notoriously ill-formed. 
The problem is not only that it is itself ungrounded (and implausible), 
but that we cannot even identify what to extrapolate from our present 
experience. Nelson Goodman’s “second problem of induction” was 
anticipated by Charles babbage, one of the founding fathers of the 
computer age. In 1833, he tells us, he put together a small portion of 
the calculating engine he had devised, the Difference engine, and started 
it.9  It conscientiously progressed from 1 to 2 to 3 to every number up to 
8 See W.K. Clifford, ‘The ethics of belief ’ (1877), in Lectures and Essays, eds., l. Stephen 
& F. Pollock (macmillan: london 1879), vol.2, pp. 163ff. Cf. William James, The Will to 
Believe (New York: longmans, Green & Co., 1897), p. 30: “if we believe that no bell tolls 
in us to let us know for certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a piece of idle 
fantasticality to preach so solemnly our duty of waiting for the bell.”
9 Charles babbage, The Ninth Bridgwater Treatise: a Fragment (london, 1838; re-
issued by Frank Cass: london, 1967), pp. 186ff. The treatise is so called not because 
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100,000,001. The obvious inference was that it would continue adding 
1 to each succeeding number – yet the numbers that followed were 
100,010,002; 100,030,003; 100,060,004; 100,100,005; 100,150, 006 “and 
so on” until the 2672nd term, when the rule seemed to change again (and 
yet again after 1430 terms, and again after 950, and so on)10. 
Now it must be remarked, that the law that each number presented by 
the engine is greater by unity than the preceding number, which law the 
observer had deduced from an induction of a hundred million instances, 
was not the true law that regulated its action; and that the occurrence 
of the number 100,010,002 at the 100,000,002d term was as necessary 
a consequence of the original adjustment, and might have been as fully 
foreknown at the commencement, as was the regular succession of any 
one of the intermediate numbers to its immediate antecedent. The same 
remark applies to the next apparent deviation from the new law, which 
was founded on an induction of 2761 terms, and to all the succeeding 
laws; with this limitation only that whilst their consecutive introduction 
at various definite intervals is a necessary consequence of the mechanical 
structure of the engine, our knowledge of analysis does not yet enable us 
to predict the periods at which the more distant laws will be introduced.11
A less alert investigator, of course, might simply have concluded that 
the engine was defective. The problem is that any engine, any predictive 
device, may have some similar “defect”, even if this isn’t manifest within 
our limited experience. We cannot know what is meant when we 
speak even of such simple things as acorns, cats or children, since we 
cannot know what even such things would be or will be under different 
conditions, nor what property it is that we are to extrapolate.
but though the principles of abstract reason (never to accept 
a  contradiction; never to believe without “sufficient” evidence; always 
to discount one’s own position, feelings and inchoate intuitions, while 
at the same time assuming that the world outside our experience is just 
like the world within, and so on) aren’t helpful as absolute rules, we may 
continue commonsensically to think that we can tell the “rational” from 
the “irrational”, the ignorant or insane. We cannot, practically speaking, 
live like “rationalists” of the stricter sort, but we may often find it wise to 
babbage had written eight earlier ones, but because it was an uncanonical addition to the 
eight bridgwater Treatises composed by other leading 19th century thinkers. 
10 Ibid., pp. 34ff.
11 Ibid., pp. 38f. 
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suspend judgement upon many things, or at least not leap too quickly to 
conclusions. Whether this caution will prevail, who knows?
This pragmatic, commonsensical approach to “reasoning” is 
compatible even with those “animistic” habits of mind that modern 
atheists despise: imagining ourselves into the life of stars, clouds, trees 
or engines may make it easier to live with them, and even easier to 
predict their actions. but we may still feel that “right reason” requires 
a commitment to a universal truth, and to disown error. That ascetic 
demand, to purge ourselves of error even when that error is very useful, 
has a theological origin. Thomas Sprat, in his history of the royal Society, 
borrowed ideas from Athanasius to promote his “experimentalist” creed:
The poets of old to make all things look more venerable than they 
were devised a thousand false Chimaeras; on every Field, river, Grove 
and Cave they bestowed a Fantasm of their own making: With these 
they amazed the world ... And in the modern Ages these Fantastical 
Forms were reviv’d and possessed Christendom. ... All which abuses if 
those acute Philosophers did not promote, yet they were never able to 
overcome; nay, not even so much as King oberon and his invisible Army. 
but from the time in which the real Philosophy has appear’d there is 
scarce any whisper remaining of such horrors ... The course of things 
goes quietly along, in its own true channel of Natural Causes and effects. 
For this we are beholden to experiments; which though they have not 
yet completed the discovery of the true world, yet they have already 
vanquished those wild inhabitants of the false world, that us’d to astonish 
the minds of men.12
To live as theists of this “rational” kind is to act on the assumption that 
there is a truth that we can partly learn (and should) by following an 
ascetic path, purging ourselves of idolatry. The obligation also requires 
12 Thomas Sprat, (History of the Royal Society 1702, p. 340) against fairies (cited by 
basil Wiley, The Seventeenth Century Background (london: Chatto & Windus, 1934), 
p. 213.) Sprat borrowed his imagery from See St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation (written 
c. 318 AD), op.cit., ch. 8, para. 47: “In former times every place was full of the fraud of 
oracles, and the utterances of those at Delphi and Dodona and in boeotia and lycia and 
libya and egypt and those of the Kabiri and the Pythoness were considered marvellous 
by the minds of men. but now since Christ has been proclaimed everywhere, their 
madness too has ceased, and there is no one left among them to give oracles at all. Then, 
too, demons used to deceive men’s minds by taking up their abode in springs or rivers 
or trees or stones and imposing upon simple people by their frauds. but now, since the 
Divine appearing of the Word, all this fantasy has ceased, for by the sign of the cross, 
if a man will but use it, he drives out their deceits.”
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us to cooperate with others: a truth that is only mine is not a truth worth 
having, and one that is also “ours” must be approached together. Some 
philosophical theists may end there, with a purely “rational religion”, one 
that can be made plausible to “just anyone” willing to enquire into the 
grounds of scientific discovery. but “rational religion” is perhaps more 
vulnerable than its advocates desire. once it is agreed that it is down 
to “us” to judge religious belief and practice, and to do so by appeal to 
presently commonsensical beliefs, the content of traditional belief may 
be gradually eroded, or made to sound less plausible. Does the minimal, 
rational theism I have so far defended do much more than agree that 
there is an intelligible world whose nature is also partly present in its 
parts? each bit of the world, including our own mentality, embodies 
universal principles. If it were not so, it seems, there would be no world 
to understand, nor any living creature to understand it. What need of 
further ritual or elaborate story? What need of pious imagination? How 
does rational religion differ from an elementary, largely pragmatic, 
moralism about the importance of social exchanges and a less prejudicial 
outlook? Surely religion as ordinarily understood is more exciting, and 
more contestable?
ANTITHeSIS: TrADITIoNAl relIGIoN
According to emile Durkheim, most actual believers “feel that the real 
function of religion is not to make us think, to enrich our knowledge, 
nor to add to the conceptions which we owe to science others of another 
origin and another character, but rather, it is to make us act, to aid us 
to live”. He also acknowledges that religion “is not merely a system of 
practices - but also a system of ideas whose object is to explain the 
world”.13 but the primary purpose of “religion”, in its broadest sense, is 
rather to inspire than to explain.
The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man 
who sees new truths of which the unbeliever is ignorant; he is a man 
who is stronger. He feels within him more force, either to endure 
the trials of existence, or to conquer them. It is as though he were 
raised above the miseries of the world, because he is raised above his 
condition as a mere man; he believes that he is saved from evil, under 
13 emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life: A Study in Religious 
Sociology, tr. J.W. Swain (london: Allen & unwin, 1915), p. 428.
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whatever form he may conceive this evil. The first article in every 
creed is the belief in salvation by faith.
To cultivate and maintain that faith we need the cult:
Whoever has really practised a religion knows very well that it is the 
cult which gives rise to these impressions of joy, of interior peace, of 
serenity, of enthusiasm which are, for the believer, an experimental proof 
of his beliefs. The cult is not simply a system of signs by which the faith 
is outwardly translated; it is a collection of the means by which this is 
created and recreated periodically. Whether it consists in material acts or 
mental operations, it is always this which is efficacious.14
Faith is not credulity. It is the repeated invocation of a sustaining spirit 
through cultic practices, a spirit no less efficacious for being, perhaps, 
imaginary. The cultic practices themselves may have a natural origin: we 
don’t need a religious education to find it natural to rouse, for example, 
a spirit of righteous anger by stomping up and down and shouting. Nor 
do we need romantic comedies to learn how to encourage ourselves and 
others to season our lusts with humour. but common practices and artistry 
play a role in channelling our spirits into particular forms, and may also 
offer doctrines to believe in, doctrines that may last longer than the first 
emotions. The doctrines flow from the rituals, and the rituals from the 
emotions, but doctrines then influence rituals, and rituals the emotions. 
The development of Christian doctrine in its early centuries was guided 
by the practice of the worshipping community: because Christians felt 
the figure of Jesus animated in their rituals they were compelled to 
conclude that Jesus must be the Word of God. He was present to them 
in the stories they exchanged, and in the breaking of bread together. The 
Councils that left us the strange doctrines, of Christ’s two natures, and 
the divine Trinity, were not engaged in abstract theological reflection 
for its own sake (though doubtless some theologians were), but seeking 
to give a memorable account of the story they and other believers were 
enacting daily, weekly, and over the ceremonial year.
This is not the end of the story. The Christian religion (or any other 
serious creed) is not only a verbal counterpart of cultic practices, and 
these are not followed only to keep our spirits up. Tertullian was quite 
right to insist that there were good reasons actually to believe the 
doctrines, the more firmly because they were so odd that no-one would 
14 Durkheim, op.cit., pp. 416-17.
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have propounded them unless there were: “natus est Dei Filius: non 
pudet quia pudendum est; et mortuus est Dei Filius: prorsus credibile est, 
quia ineptum est; et sepultus resurrexit: certum est, quia impossibile”.15 
There were many easier ways of preaching the Gospel: if the early Church 
settled on these particular doctrines it was at least not the easier option.
but nowadays it is better to start with the emotive, affective aspects 
of religion, if only to avoid laborious and pointless exchanges about 
the Spaghetti monster. God isn’t an entity like that, one that might or 
might not “exist”, against a natural background. The question can also be 
addressed metaphysically, as it is by macIntyre:
To believe in God is not to believe that in addition to nature, about which 
atheists and theists can agree, there is something else, about which they 
disagree. It is rather that theists and atheists disagree about nature as well 
as about God. For theists believe that nature presents itself as radically 
incomplete, as requiring a ground beyond itself, if it is to be intelligible, 
and so their disagreement with atheists involves everything.16
This is clearly correct, but the first step is more easily taken through the 
emotive or ethical aspects of theism. “believing in God” or at least the 
God of Abraham, whatever else it is, is a commitment to the possibility 
and eventual success of Justice. believers bind themselves to a cause, and 
nourish their commitment by reciting and acting out the stories that 
give weight and sense to it – which is not simply to the present order of 
society, but to an hypothesized ideal: to do justice and love mercy. marx 
was right at least in this: “religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, 
the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the 
opium of the people.”17 The point of religion, or religion of the mainstream 
Abrahamic sort, is not to reconcile us to iniquity, but to remind us of an 
alternative. A belief in God’s omnipotence does not necessarily require 
that we believe that everything that now happens is His Will, but that His 
Will shall prevail, His Kingdom come. ‘magna est veritas, et praevalebit.’ 
15 Tertullian, De carne Christi, 5.4, after Aristotle: see James moffat, ‘Aristotle and 
Tertullian’ in Journal of Theological Studies 17 (1916), pp. 170-1, pointing to Aristotle, 
Rhetoric, 2.23,22: there are some stories so improbable in themselves that no one would 
have invented them. See also robert D. Sider, ‘Credo quia Absurdum?’, in Classical World 
73 (1980), pp. 417-9.
16 Alasdair macIntyre, God, Philosophy, Universities: A History of the Catholic 
Philosophical Tradition (london: rowman & littlefield, 2009), p. 47.
17 Karl marx, ‘Introduction’ to The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. Joseph 
o’malley (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1970; 1st published 1843-4).
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believing in the Divine Trinity is believing in the possibility and hope of 
love, the community of the holy ones.
may not Christians ... be allowed to believe the divinity of our Saviour, 
or that in Him God and man make one Person, and be verily persuaded 
thereof, so far as for such faith or belief to become a real principle of life 
and conduct? inasmuch as, by virtue of such persuasion, they submit 
to His government, believe His doctrine, and practise His precepts, 
although they form no abstract idea of the union between the divine and 
human nature; nor may be able to clear up the notion of person to the 
contentment of a minute philosopher.18
This interpretation of doctrine seems easier in “primitive” religions. 
raising sceptical doubts about the actors who don ceremonial masks 
to impersonate or represent the many gods of popular Hindu religion, 
or Voodoo, or the Australian Dreamtime, looks much like the crasser 
forms of Christian missionary endeavour. It would be like telling Star 
Trek enthusiasts that there is no Federation, or that Vulcans and earth-
humans could not possibly interbreed. It is more easily assumed that 
even Star Trek enthusiasts know that very well, and that even “primitive 
polytheists” are aware that they are acting.
And why not? The very thing that makes us human is our imaginative 
capacity, our talent and our desire for imaginative fictions that can 
gather up our manifold experience, offer engaging characters and plots 
for ourselves to take on board, and unite into a single story people who 
might otherwise be enemies. unlike other animals – or what we conceive 
to be true of other animals – we each live within at least two worlds: the 
world of ordinary sensibilia, and the world of imagination. Sometimes 
that imagined world so permeates the sensible that we see no difference. 
Sometimes we can convince ourselves that the imagined world is more 
real than the sensible. The epic of an expanding universe, dark matter, 
black holes and supernovas sprinkling the elements of life around the 
galaxies impresses us as “real”, even though we mostly pay no attention 
at all to it. We may be the more easily persuaded that traditional religion 
teaches truth precisely because the gods it imagines are obviously present 
with us, in ordinary life as well as ritual. No one can seriously doubt the 
reality of Aphrodite, or Ares, or Apollo, whether they are gods or demons 
18 George berkeley, Alciphron (euphranor speaks), in Works of George Berkeley, eds., 
A.A. luce & T.e. Jessop (Thomas Nelson: london, 1946-57), vol.3, p. 298.
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or allegorical fictions. Poets and fantasists nowadays don’t invent new 
gods, but they do invent characters and superheroes, which then become 
common stock for individual and collective fantasy. We know very well 
that Sherlock Holmes, James bond and Wonder Woman “don’t exist”, 
any more than Santa Claus or Terry Pratchett’s Death. but we also know 
that these characters are influential, and can be invoked to structure 
our personal motives. It is pointless, naïve, absurdly literal-minded, 
to complain about an author’s inconsistencies, or creative attitude to 
history – unless the critic is cooperating in creating the imagined world, 
or unless she has her own commitments to a different theme than the 
author’s. In either case the point would not be to insist that the created 
world is at odds with “reason”, or is not “realistic”. Artists, authors and 
the founders of religions are expanding our imaginative experience. 
Whether we are inspired to join them in their endeavour, or to denounce 
them in whatever terms we wish, is not a matter for reason to decide, but 
imagination and desire.
SYNTHeSIS: rADICAl or mYSTICAl relIGIoN
Sociological analysis of “religion” has usually suggested that the rituals 
and stories serve to maintain the actual social order, and even that God 
or the gods are idealized versions of that order. “really” we are all just 
worshipping our collective selves. There is probably some truth in this. 
The powerful will always seize on whatever story helps them to maintain 
their power, and suppress whatever story or ceremonial may remind us 
of alternatives. They may even adopt and reconstruct the very rites and 
creeds that once enabled a rebellion against an older order, and sincerely 
(or self-deceivingly) imagine that they themselves are the stuff of which 
rebels and martyrs are made. modern Western atheism itself can be 
interpreted as just such a revolt against established gods – a revolt that 
has now been co-opted to secure the State against any thought of a rival. 
modern atheists often sound much more like Inquisitors than martyrs, 
and it is easy to suspect that they would indeed have been Inquisitors 
in an earlier age, self-assured in their own stories but fearful of the 
opposition. And of course – to spread the critical comments round – the 
early Christian Church, which was once deemed atheistical precisely 
because it would not acknowledge the established gods, learnt rather too 
well the mechanisms of control that had been used against it.
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It is nonetheless important for unbelievers and believers alike to recall 
the mainstream Abrahamic message:
Follow a light that leaps and spins, 
Follow the fire unfurled! 
For riseth up against realm and rod, 
A thing forgotten, a thing downtrod, 
The last, lost giant, even God, 
Is risen against the world.19
Chesterton associated this aspect of religion specifically with the 
Christian tradition:
That a good man may have his back to the wall is no more than we knew 
already; but that God could have his back to the wall is a boast for all 
insurgents for ever. Christianity is the only religion on earth that has felt 
that omnipotence made God incomplete. Christianity alone has felt that 
God, to be wholly God, must have been a rebel as well as a king. Alone 
of all creeds, Christianity has added courage to the virtues of the Creator. 
For the only courage worth calling courage must necessarily mean that 
the soul passes a breaking point - and does not break.20
Jewish tradition is not that far from the thought, supposing that God 
suffers along with His people and sustains them through that suffering. 
The strange Christian development of the theory rests on the idea that 
an invulnerable God can’t suffer along with us unless He could somehow 
also suffer in His own person.21 on the one hand, God cannot face 
destruction; on the other, yes, He can.
Neither the Abrahamic nor the buddhist religious tradition can be 
satisfied simply with the social and mythological order we have inherited. 
both include in their founding myths the idea that we should leave those 
orders, and cannot always rely on traditional authority. As berkeley said:
In our nonage while our minds are empty and unoccupied many notions 
easily find admittance, and as they grow with us and become familiar to 
our understandings we continue a fondness for them. ... but we would do 
well to consider that other men have imbibed early notions, that they as 
19 G.K. Chesterton, Collected Poems (london: methuen, 1950), p. 268. 
20 G.K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (Chicago: moody Press, 2009; 1st published 1908), 
p. 206. Hindus, of course, have the story of Krishna to remind them that a god could live 
through the same catastrophes as harass us, and die by accident. but Krishna does not 
clearly submit Himself to human law, nor yet experience defeat.
21 See Peter Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1977).
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well as we have a country, friends, and persons whom they esteem. These 
are pleas which may be made for any opinion, and are consequently good 
pleas for none.22
At the same time, we have to make a start from somewhere, and tradition 
gives us that beginning: “if we were left, every one to his own experience, 
[we] could know little either of the earth itself or of those things the 
Almighty has placed thereon: so swift is our progress from the womb to the 
grave”.23 There is a further problem, about the ordering of our lives together.
There must ... of necessity, in every State, be a certain system of salutary 
notions, a prevailing set of opinions, acquired either by private reason 
and reflection or taught and instilled by the general reason of the public, 
that is, by the law of the land. ... Nor will it be any objection to say that 
these are prejudices; inasmuch as they are therefore neither less useful 
nor less true, although their proofs may not be understood by all men. ... 
The mind of a young creature cannot remain empty; if you do not put 
into it that which is good, it will be sure to receive that which is bad. Do 
what you can, there will still be a bias from education; and if so, is it not 
better this bias should lie towards things laudable and useful to society? ... 
If you strip men of these their notions, or, if you will, prejudices, with 
regard to modesty, decency, justice, charity, and the like, you will soon 
find them so many monsters, utterly unfit for human society.24
If we can manage to believe that tradition at least contains a valuable 
starting point, we can also learn to correct it. If it is merely the product 
of chance variation and natural selection for reproductive advantage it 
seems difficult to see why we should trust it, or our individual reasonings, 
even so much. A merely naturalistic, “unbelieving”, account of the world 
and human history can hardly avoid despair. “What beauty can be found 
in a moral system, formed, and governed by chance, fate or any other 
blind, unthinking principle?”25 I do not mean that unbelievers must 
all, pejoratively, be infidels. on the contrary, I am arguing that we do 
22 berkeley, ‘Sermon on religious Zeal’ (1709-12), in Works, op.cit., vol. 7, p. 20. 
See also my ‘berkeley’s Philosophy of religion’, in Kenneth Winckler ed., Cambridge 
Companion to Berkeley (New York: Cambridge university Press, 2005), pp. 369-404.
23.berkeley, ‘Sermon on Immortality’, in Works op.cit., vol. 7, p. 14.
24. berkeley, ‘Discourse to magistrates’, in Works op.cit., vol. 6, pp. 203f
25 berkeley, Alciphron (euphranor speaks), in Works op.cit., vol. 3, p. 128. See also e.o. 
Wilson on our moral feelings as a “hodge podge” of evolutionary adaptations, which 
we could some day reorganize, without any better goal than to keep our line alive: On 
Human Nature (Cambridge, mass: Harvard university Press, 1978), p. 196.
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not depend for our happiness on reason, and even atheists who pride 
themselves on being “bright” are as irrational as any. one of buddha’s 
sermons offered the image of an enormous mountain that was irreversibly 
advancing on us all. If this were so, he enquired, would we not be seeking 
some way to escape? And yet, there is exactly such a mountain coming: 
not merely our own individual deaths, but the deaths of everyone and 
everything we love, an absolute destruction of all we might achieve.26 
And yet we all ignore this fact in almost every moment of our lives 
together. Some modern transhumanists sketch out both near-future 
and far-future stories in which we and our craft-enhanced descendants 
remake the worlds. Some even acknowledge that they are offering 
a naturalized religion, a technological realization of the opium dream.27 
There can be no present proof that these futures would be either possible 
or desirable: they are commitments that go far beyond the evidence. The 
difference between the transhumanist and the older believer is the moral 
that they draw: the older believer, hoping to be caught up into the dance 
of immortal love, concluded that we must seek to act and imagine as that 
dance requires. In short, that we need to love one another, and see the 
god or the god-to-be in each of us. The transhumanist moral is rather 
that we must seize the present opportunity for physical and biological 
research, and keep the research grants coming!28
one other response to the advancing mountain is simply to forget 
it. our error, it may be said, is always to be living outside the present, in 
hope or fear or desperate depression. Thus an old story, first seen in the 
Mahabharata, is gradually turned into advice to “gather rosebuds while 
ye may”:29
A man travelling across a field ecountered a tiger. He fled, the tiger after 
him. Coming to a precipice, he caught hold of the root of a wild vine and 
swung himself down over the edge. The tiger sniffed at him from above. 
26 As bertrand russell, rather pompously, reminded us in Mysticism and Logic (london: 
longmans, Green & Co., 1918), p. 56. logan Pearsall Smith mocked the rhetoric in All 
Trivia (london: Constable & Co., 1933), p. 81. See also my From Athens to Jerusalem: the 
Love of Wisdom and the Love of God (oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 12-13.
27 See ‘Deep Time: does it matter?’ in George ellis, ed., The Far-Future Universe 
(radnor, Pennsylvania: Templeton Foundation Press, 2002), pp. 177-95.
28 See Frank J. Tipler, The Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, God and the 
Resurrection of the Dead (New York: Doubleday, 1994).
29 robert Herrick, ‘To the Virgins, to make much of time’ (1648): Arthur Quiller-
Couch, ed., The Oxford Book of English Verse: 1250–1900 (oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1939), p. 274 (that is, get laid before it is too late).
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Trembling, the man looked down to where, far below, another tiger was 
waiting to eat him. only the vine sustained him. Two mice, one white 
and one black, little by little started to gnaw away the vine. The man saw 
a luscious strawberry near him. Grasping the vine with one hand, he 
plucked the strawberry with the other. How sweet it tasted!30
The original point of the story was rather to point out how easily we are 
distracted, and to suggest that we should regard all these dangers and 
delights – but especially the delights – as unimportant, and set ourselves 
to escape. even the “presentist” moral is a lot more difficult to act upon 
than any simple injunction to eat, drink and be merry: we cannot afford 
to dull our senses and imagination if we are even to enjoy the moment. 
And the original moral is still stranger if there could really be no way 
out. The secular interpretation of the story, so to speak, is also very easy 
to mock:
It’s really impressive the way modern psycho-analysis has confirmed 
the insights of the New Testament. Where two or three are gathered 
together, you know. It is an indisputable fact that groups of people, 
huddled together as closely as possible, do feel warmer. That is the basis 
of Group Therapy. It is also known as the Kingdom of Heaven.31
Celia Green’s sardonic comment is set in a dream-world where “sensible 
people” can think of nothing better to do than reconcile themselves 
and others to a frozen, barren landscape. Her response, in the dream, is 
simply to wake up!
Waking up is indeed an important metaphor if we are ever to 
understand the life of faith.32 respectable philosophers in the past have 
agreed that this life, this world, is a dream and a delirium from which we 
should gladly wake.33 Plotinus noted that such waking would most likely 
be disbelieved when we drop off to sleep again.34 This world here-now 
30 Paul reps, Zen Flesh, Zen Bones (Tuttle: boston, 1957), p. 39; cf. Mahabharata bk. 
11, pp. 5-6; The Lalitavistara Sūtra: The Voice of the Buddha, the Beauty of Compassion, 
tr. Gwendolyn bays (berkeley: Dharma Publishing, 1983). See Helen b. Holt/Karma 
Sangye Khandro, ‘Honey or Nectar’: url = <http://www.khandro.net/nature_honey.
htm> (accessed 28th April 2011) for a brief account of the story’s transmutations.
31 Celia Green, The Human Evasion (london: Hamish Hamilton, 1969), p. 124.
32 I began examining it in ‘Waking-up: a neglected model for the After-life’: 
Inquiry 26 (1983), pp. 209ff, and have addressed the issue periodically since then, 
See especially Understanding Faith: Religious Belief and its Place in Society (exeter: 
Imprint Academic, 2009), pp. 158-71.
33 marcus Aurelius, Meditations 2.17.1.
34 Plotinus, Ennead V.5 [32].11.
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is not the real world. So Chesterton was perhaps not quite correct: it is 
not after all a sure mark of sanity to think we are awake already. He may 
still have been right to suggest that we should take the dream seriously. 
“Whether it’s reality or a dream, doing what’s right is what matters. If it’s 
reality, then for the sake of reality; if it’s a dream, then for the purpose 
of winning friends for when we awaken.”35 And perhaps it is easier to 
“do what’s right” if we remember that material gains are fairy gold, that 
vanish on our waking.
but if this world and our experience of it are relatively dream-like, 
and real causes, real destinies, real effects are “outside over there”, we 
cannot expect to discover this simply from the dream itself. Perhaps, by 
sounder standards, our dream experience is implausible or incoherent, 
but we don’t have access to those standards: whatever the dream shows 
us we will take as “normal” – at least until we begin to wonder at what 
happens and its curious incongruities, its failure to be what something 
in us still demands. It is that strange feeling, not unlike what Joad called 
“the still, small voice that whispers ‘fiddlesticks’”36, that offers the first 
challenge to conventional reason, and to consensus reality.
We … have dreamt the world. We have dreamt it as firm, mysterious, 
visible, ubiquitous in space and durable in time; but in its architecture 
we have allowed tenuous and eternal crevices of unreason which tell us 
it is false.37
Conversely, once one has concluded that this world is a dream there 
is nothing the unbeliever can do to prove one wrong! If one shouldn’t 
believe anything without “sufficient” evidence it is not clear which 
belief it is from which we should withhold consent. A mere feeling or 
conviction is not proof of a kind that any court or council or laboratory 
team should countenance: but in that case, why should a mere feeling of 
“reality” – which neurophilosophers tell us is engendered in the brain, 
and could be engineered - be judged sufficient to exclude the possibility 
that we are dreaming, and that we might yet wake? That thought too, 
no doubt, can be induced – and maybe much “religious” ritual, much 
35 Pedro Calderón de la barca, Life’s A Dream (boulder, Colorado: university Press of 
Colorado, 2004; 1st published as La vida es sueño in 1635), p. 137f (Sigismund speaks).
36 G.e.m. Joad The Untutored Townsman’s Invasion of the Country (london: Faber, 
1946), p. 224. The remark is also attributed to W.K. Clifford: this is not impossible, but 
I have not located any context. 
37 J.l. borges, ‘Avatars of the Tortoise’ in Labyrinths ed. D. A. Yates and J. e. Irby 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), pp. 202-8.
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religious art and architecture, is aimed, exactly, at inducing it. So Abbot 
Suger declared of the abbey church of St.Denis, in the twelfth century, 
that there he felt himself “dwelling in some strange region of the universe 
which neither exists entirely in the slime of the earth nor entirely in the 
purity of heaven, and that by the grace of God, [he could] be transported 
from this inferior to the higher world in an anagogical manner”.38 of 
course we aren’t all moved by the very same rituals, stories or places. 
The best that we can manage, probably, is a diversity of belief: let people 
follow whatever lights they see, even if some turn out to be merely 
marsh-lights (or the Puck).
No one takes hold of the world immediately; between the two there 
imposes speech, the language of society, the inherited store of concepts 
and images. ... It is by the multiplication of ways of talking that we attain 
the plenitude of plenitudes.39
but we still need faith to carry on our own particular journey, and would 
feel easier in our minds if we could identify some generally plausible 
criterion for picking our direction, and some sketchy idea of what the 
world should be if our journey is to be a hopeful one. What signs might 
we encounter that would confirm our choice, or send us another way? If 
this world here-now is indeed a dream how shall we wake, and what will 
the waking world turn out to be?
our country from which we came is There, our Father is There. How 
shall we travel to it, where is our way of escape? We cannot get there 
on foot; for our feet only carry us everywhere in this world, from one 
country to another. You must not get ready a carriage, either, or a boat. 
let all these things go, and do not look. Shut your eyes, and change to 
and wake another way of seeing, which everyone has but few use.40
both rational and traditional religion are mainly concerned to help us 
live here-now, to give us the intellectual and emotional strength to carry 
on. We live with inconsistencies. Truth may indeed, as boethius hoped, 
be “one, without a flaw”41, but we have no immediate access to that 
38 e. Panofsky ed., Abbot Suger on the Abbey Church of St.-Denis (Princeton: Princeton 
university Press, 1945), p. 65.
39 A. lacy, Miguel de Unamuno: the Rhetoric of Existence (The Hague: mouton & Co., 
1967), p. 124, paraphrasing unamuno. 
40 Plotinus, Ennead I.6 [1].8. 
41 boethius, Consolation of Philosophy: Medieval Latin Lyrics, tr. Helen Waddell 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1952; 1st published 1929), p. 59.
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single, singular truth. We are all, initially, polytheists, acknowledging 
many different and conflicting demands on our reason, time and 
energy, and merely hoping that the conflicts will not tear us quite apart. 
No single ideal that we conceive will reconcile the differences within us 
and between us: indeed, the more vociferous the advocates of some one 
way of seeing the more they engender conflict and reprisals – a lesson 
that some modern atheists would do well to learn. Chesterton’s most 
eloquent argument for the primacy of the Catholic Church was that 
it had, he thought, managed to harness many different impulses and 
partial truths, allowing the lion, as it were, to lie down with the lamb 
without demanding that he not be a  lion.42 The best that most of us 
can manage is to serve our partial ideals, our partial truths, without 
denying that others have partial truths as well, or neglecting the truths 
we own – which is itself a working contradiction! 
So does “religion” give us any clues to follow? The greatest, most 
seminal figures of our religious history are those who renounced “the 
world”, whether by literally abandoning all their this-worldly concerns, 
what to eat or drink or wear, or at least by refusing any this-worldly 
honours. even their disciples did almost as much. one of Plotinus’s 
disciples, for example, the roman Senator rogatianus, “gave up all his 
property, dismissed all his servants, and resigned his rank. … He only 
ate every other day.”43 renunciation, turning away from the temptations 
of the dream, was at least a preparation for the day when we wake up. 
For some, it may have been an actual awakening. It is unsurprising 
that any messages they then brought back to the dreamers seems 
“unreasonable”. It is, after all, the dream that dictates to the rest of us 
what we consider reason.
Plotinus recognized truths which we, whether we will or not, must call 
revelations, which are entirely strange to the modern consciousness and 
even excite the highest degree of indignation. And now the main point: 
when Plotinus had to decide between “revealed” and “natural” truths, he 
unhesitatingly took the side of the former: “that which appears most real 
to common consciousness has the least existence”.44
42 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, op.cit., p. 148 after Isaiah 12.6. 
43 Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 7.32-40: Plotinus, tr. A.H. Armstrong, vol.1 (london: 
loeb Classical library, Heinemann, 1966), p. 27.
44 lev Shestov, In Job’s Balances, tr. Camilla Coventry and C.A. macartney, ed. bernard 
martin (ohio: ohio university Press, 1975), Pt. 3 ‘Plotinus’s ecstasies’, after Ennead, V.5 
[32].11: url = <http://shestov.by.ru/ijb/jb_0.html>
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Plato had said the same – that the prisoner released from his chains and 
brought up into the light would at first be dazzled, and would find his 
fellow prisoners wholly unbelieving of his revelation if he were to go 
back down into the cave.45 Why should we believe him? Why should we 
not? If it is wrong, as rationalists hold, to believe what someone tells us, 
without the blessing of “reason”, it must also be wrong to go on believing 
what we already do, without the blessing of “reason”.So which prophet 
shall we follow? You and I here-now are unlikely ourselves to abandon 
property and rank and family to practise extreme austerities (or even 
minor ones). religious traditions that demand that everyone renounce 
the world in just that way don’t usually, it seems, survive! We can hope 
that there will be a place in the Kingdom for such householders and fairly 
honest citizens as do not take the unfamiliar road. but we may still also 
hope for some words from, as it were, the athletes of the spirit. Shall we 
read the buddha’s sermons, or the Desert Fathers? Shall we hope for our 
sense of self to be dissolved, and a subsequent unveiling of the unborn 
and Indestructible without which, so the buddha taught us, there could 
be no escape from Here?46 or shall we hope instead to recall our higher 
selves, and rejoin the dance of immortal love, as pagan Platonists like 
Plotinus hoped? or follow the Incarnate Word, as Christians should? or 
imagine a transhumanist utopia at the end of time (an event indefinitely 
delayed)?47 How different in actual practice are the claims? The many 
different forms and recipes of consciously unreasonable religion may 
offer us too many choices: how can we sensibly choose, when the very 
criteria for choice are determined by the choice we shall have made? And 
if there is no reasonable choice, in that sense, must we not – logically 
– conclude that we must make unreasonable choices? We cannot avoid 
45 Plato, Republic, 7.514a-518b.
46 “There is, monks, an unborn – unbecome – unmade – unfabricated. If there were 
not that unborn – unbecome – unmade – unfabricated, there would not be the case that 
emancipation from the born – become – made – fabricated would be discerned. but 
precisely because there is an unborn – unbecome – unmade – unfabricated, emancipation 
from the born – become – made – fabricated is discerned”: Khuddaka Nikaya (Collection 
of little Texts), bk. 3 Udana (exclamations) 8:3: ‘Nibbana Sutta: Total unbinding (3)’, tr. 
Thanissaro bhikkhu Access to Insight, 8 July 2010, url = <http://www.accesstoinsight.
org/tipitaka/kn/ud/ud.8.03.than.html> (accessed 29th April 2011).
47 See Freeman J. Dyson, ‘Time without end: Physics and biology in an open universe’: 
Reviews of Modern Physics, 51.3 (1979), reprinted in Selected Papers of Freeman Dyson 
(Providence, rhode Island: American mathematical Society, 1996), pp. 529-42; url = 
<http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Global/omega/dyson.txt> (accessed 29th April 2011).
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the choice: whatever happens we will have walked a particular path 
through life, without any prior proof that ours is the one right way. Nor 
is anything gained by appealing to any supposedly infallible authority, 
whether papal or scientific: “of what use is an infallible guide without 
an infallible sign to know him by?”48 We must end by hoping that “in 
every Humane Creature there is a ray of common sense, an original 
light of reason and nature which the worst and most bigoted education, 
although it may impair, can never quite extinguish”.49
And so I end at my beginning: the light of reason, properly understood, 
must be our guide – but that light is neither to be equated with my own 
individual conviction50 nor yet with consensus reality. Neither I nor We 
determine what is true, but the Truth, if we are not wholly to despair, 
must still be somehow in us. our commitment must always be to the 
Truth itself, and not just to our best image of that Truth, although we 
cannot thus be committed to the Truth except by following our best 
image, while still being ready to be deprived of it. This is the final paradox 
of reason; that our goal, the Good, must lie beyond both intellect and 
being.51 And Intellect is most itself “when it goes out of its mind ‘drunk 
with the nectar’; then it falls in love, simplified into happiness by having 
its fill, and it is better for it to be drunk with a drunkenness like this than 
to be more respectably sober”.52 That Intellect is indistinguishable from 
Faith, and that Faith is God.53 
48 berkeley, ‘letter to Sir John James’, in Works op.cit., vol. 7, p. 148.
49 berkeley, ‘Primary Visitation Charge’, in Works op.cit., vol. 7, p. 163.
50 That would then be “an inward conceited principle ... sufficient to dissolve any 
human fabric of polity or civil government”: berkeley, ‘Discourse to magistrates’, in 
Works op.cit., vol. 6, p. 217.
51 Plato, Republic, 6.509b.
52 Plotinus, Ennead, VI.7 [38].35. 
53 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.1072b28.
